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According to contextualism, the extension of claims of personal taste is 
dependent on the context of utterance. According to truth relativism, their 
extension depends on the context of assessment. On this view, when the tastes 
of a speaker change, so does the truth value of a previously uttered taste claim, 
and if it is false, the speaker is required to retract it. Both views make strong 
empirical assumptions, which are here put to the test for the first time in three 
experiments with over 740 participants. It turns out that the linguistic behaviour 
of ordinary English speakers is consistent with contextualist predictions and 
inconsistent with the predictions of the most widely discussed form of truth 




1.1 Indexical Contextualism 
Indexical contextualism is a semantic theory according to which claims 
involving predicates of personal taste such as ‘delicious’, ‘tasty’ or ‘fun’ are 
context-dependent. 1  The relevant standard of taste of, say, ‘Spinach is 
delicious’ is determined by the context of utterance, and it manifests itself, 
albeit tacitly, at the level of the content expressed by the utterance. Claims of 
this sort are thus somewhat analogous to utterances invoking strict indexicals 
such as ‘I’ or ‘now’. What a sentence like ‘I am hungry’ expresses can vary 
across contexts, since different contexts of utterance may supply different 
values for the first person pronoun, that is, different speakers. The default value 
of perspectival claims is also the perspective of the speaker, though sometimes 
it is the perspective of another individual, or some contextually salient group. 
Standardly, however, indexical contextualists take (1) to mean (2):  
																																																								
1 The semantics of predicates of personal taste has received a lot of attention over the last two 
decades. An incomplete list of important contributions includes Kölbel (2002, 2004, 2004, 2009), 
Lasersohn (2005, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2017), Stojanovic (2007, 2017), Stephenson (2007), Recanati 
(2007), Glanzberg (2007), MacFarlane (2007, 2014), Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) as well as 
the Analysis book symposium (2011) about the latter, Sæbø (2009), Moltmann (2010), Egan 
(2010), Sundell (2011), Schaffer (2011), Huvenes (2012), Collins (2013), Marques (2014, 2018), 




(1) Spinach is tasty.   
(2) Spinach is tasty for me.  
 
This intuitively plausible picture has recently come under attack, principally on 
the basis of two arguments: The argument from faultless disagreement, and 
the argument from required retraction. The former has been employed to 
motivate a position called nonindexical contextualism, the latter to motivate 
truth relativism. Here we focus on the latter.    
 
1.2 Truth Relativism 
Truth relativism2 differs from indexical contextualism in three regards: Firstly, 
perspectival elements such as the relevant standard of taste are not part of the 
Kaplanian content of the proposition expressed by an utterance, but a 
parameter in the circumstance of evaluation like worlds or times. The content 
itself is perspective-neutral, just as it is time-neutral on a temporalist view of 
propositions such as Kaplan’s (1989) own. Secondly, which standard of taste is 
relevant does not depend on the context of utterance, but on some context of 
assessment. Since there are countless contexts of assessment – in contrast to 
a single context of utterance per utterance – the truth-value of the proposition 
expressed is non-constant: It can vary across contexts of assessment, 
depending on the assessor’s standard of taste. Thirdly, if the taste of a speaker 
evolves, her previous claim might no longer be accurate or true with respect 
to her current context of assessment. In such a case, the speaker – if challenged 
by an interlocutor – is required to retract or take back her previous claim.3 Here 
is an instructive passage by MacFarlane:  
 
When our own tastes change, so that a food we used to find pleasant 
to the taste now tastes bad, we may say that we were mistaken in saying 
that the food was “tasty.” When I was a kid, I once told my mother, 
“Fish sticks are tasty.” Now that I have exposed my palate to a broader 
range of tastes, I think I was wrong about that; I’ve changed my mind 
																																																								
2 Defenders of the position, not necessarily limited to predicates of personal taste, are inter alia 
MacFarlane (2007, 2014), Egan (2007), Lasersohn (2005, 2016) and Beddor & Egan (2018). This 
paper predominantly focuses on MacFarlane’s truth relativism.  
3  For detailed discussion of retractions, see Ferrari (2016), Marques (2018), Zakkou (2019), 
Caponetto (2020). 
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about the tastiness of fish sticks. So, if someone said, “But you said 
years ago that fish sticks were tasty,” I would retract the earlier 
assertion. I wouldn’t say, “They were tasty then, but they aren’t tasty 
any more,” since that would imply that their taste changed. Nor would 
I say, “When I said that, I only meant that they were tasty to me then.” 
I didn’t mean that. At the time I took myself to be disagreeing with 
adults who claimed that fish sticks weren’t tasty. (2014: 13,14) 
 
What the example brings out is that the truth of claims of personal taste is 
assessment-sensitive (i.e. it depends on features of the context of assessment), 
and that this is demonstrated by the retraction of such claims at contexts of 
assessment at which they are no longer true. This can be fleshed out a bit. 
MacFarlane proposes a norm-driven picture of assertion, that is, a view 
according to which the practice of assertion is governed by certain constitutive 
rules. According to one such rule, a speaker should only assert what is true:   
 
Reflexive Truth Rule: An agent is permitted to assert that p at context 
c1 only if p is true as used at c1 and assessed from c2. (2014: 103) 
 
The reflexive truth rule might seem puzzling, in so far as the context of 
utterance (or use) and the context of assessment coincide. This means – as 
MacFarlane acknowledges – that it ‘will not help us make sense of relative 
truth, for it leaves contexts of assessment without any essential role to play’ 
(2014, p. 104). However, the truth rule does not exhaust the normative 
constraints that govern assertion. As illustrated by the fish sticks example, there 
seems to be another constitutive rule in play, a rule in which contexts of 
assessment play a central role:  
 
Retraction Rule: An agent in context c2 is required to retract an 
(unretracted) assertion of p made at c1 if p is not true as used at c1 and 
assessed from c2. (2014: 108) 
 
Hence: Young MacFarlane was permitted to utter ‘Fish sticks are tasty’, since 
the claim was true as used and assessed from the context of utterance. Once 
his tastes have evolved, however, he has to admit (if challenged) that his claim 
was false since it is inaccurate from his present context of assessment. But if 
the previously made claim is now considered as having been false, MacFarlane 
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suggests, it needs to be retracted so as to ‘undo the normative commitments’ 
undertaken by the speaker when it was uttered. In sum, relativism proposes a 
view that defines truth-evaluation as dependent on contexts of assessment, 
and suggests that the retraction of taste claims arises in virtue of their 
assessment-sensitivity.  
 
1.3 Two kinds of Data 
Truth Relativism about predicates of personal taste is a position that makes 
empirically testable claims about our practices of truth-ascription and the 
retraction of assertions. These claims are taken to ground certain constitutive 
norms of assertion – the truth rule and the rule of retraction. Note that the 
norms in question are behaviour-dependent: They rely on the empirical 
adequacy of the relevant descriptions of our practice of assertion. If the 
descriptive claims are false, the norms are fictitious, and the resulting account 
of assertion is distorted. Legal norms and moral norms (at least on certain 
assumptions about moral values) differ from linguistic norms in this respect: If 
nobody acts in accordance with a particular law or moral norm, it does not 
follow that such legal or moral rules do not exist. Whereas rules of this sort are 
behaviour-independent, linguistic norms are not.4 As such they are suited to 
empirical investigation. 
Advocates of relativism allege they have provided ‘data’ regarding the 
assessment-sensitivity of predicates of personal taste. This is somewhat 
euphemistic. They have provided example cases coupled with conjectures to 
the effect that ordinary language speakers react in line with relativist 
predictions. Since these conjectures are rather contentious, however, it is 
perhaps time to turn from ‘data’ to data proper.5  
 
2. Experiment 1: ‘Delicious’ and ‘Fun’ 
2.1 Scenario for ‘Delicious’ 
The retraction of claims of personal taste, relativists content, is driven by the 
assessment-sensitivity of the truth-value of such claims. If a certain taste claim 
																																																								
4 For a related point, cf. Horwich (2014). 
5  This is not intended to sound polemical. Example dialogues which test whether certain 
utterances sound felicitous make for a perfectly valid preliminary method of assessing their 
linguistic properties. However, given how contentious even these preliminary assessments are, 
and given that the debate has raged for over a decade, a more refined method of inquiry is 
required.  
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uttered at context c1 and true as assessed from c1 at some later context of 
assessment c2 is false, the speaker is required to retract because it is false at 
c2. We must thus address two core questions: (i) Whether the taste claim, true 
at a context c1, is indeed assessed as false from c2 if, at c2 the speaker’s tastes 
have changed, and (ii) whether ordinary language speakers share the 
relativist’s intuition that the speaker is required to take back their original 
utterance in such a situation.  
MacFarlane’s passage can be worked into the following scenario, which 
comes in two versions (A and B) so as to address the two questions regarding 
falsity and retraction separately: 
 
FISH STICKS  
John is five years old and loves fish sticks. One day he says to his sister Sally: ‘Fish 
sticks are delicious.’  Twenty years later his taste regarding fish sticks has changed. 
Sally asks him whether he still likes fish sticks and John says he doesn’t anymore.  
 
[A] Sally says: ‘So what you said back when you were five was false.’      
 
[B] Sally says: ‘So you are required to take back what you said about fish sticks when 
you were five.’    
   
Q. To what extent do you agree or disagree with Sally’s claim?    
 
Each participant saw either version [A] or version [B], and had to respond on a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘completely disagree’ (1) to ‘completely 
agree’ (7). Relativists would predict mean agreement with the proposed truth 
assessment and required retraction to be significantly above the midpoint of 
the scale. Contextualists, by contrast, would predict the means to lie 
significantly below the midpoint of the scale.  
 
2.2 Scenario for ‘Fun’ 
The second predicate of personal taste besides ‘tasty’ that serves as a relativist 
intuition-pump is ‘fun’ (Lasersohn 2005, 2011; Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane 
2014). We again need a scenario where the protagonist finds a particular 
activity – building sandcastles, say – fun at some stage, yet at some later 
context of assessment his preferences have changed. The two versions 





John is five years old and loves building sandcastles.  One day he says to his sister 
Sally: ‘Building sandcastles is great fun.’ Twenty years later his opinion regarding 
sandcastles has changed. Sally asks him whether he still thinks building sandcastles is 
fun, and John says he doesn't.  
 
[A] Sally says: ‘So what you said back when you were five was false.’       
  
[B] Sally says: ‘So you are required to take back what you said about building 
sandcastles when you were five.’   
 
Q.: To what extent do you agree or disagree with Sally’s claim? (1= completely 
disagree; 7= completely agree) 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions (two 
scenarios: fish sticks; sandcastle x 2 conditions: truth evaluation v. retraction).  
 
2.3 Participants 
I recruited 241 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. In line with the 
preregistration,6 subjects failing an attention check, responding in less than 15 
seconds and those whose native tongue was not English were excluded. 164 
participants remained (80 female, age M=40 years, SD=13 years).  
 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
The results are rather decisive (Figure 1): In the fish sticks scenario, people 
manifest strong disagreement with Sally’s statements that John’s taste claim 
was false (M=2.24, SD=2.02) and that it should be taken back (M=2.77, 
SD=2.10). In line with contextualist predictions and in contrast to relativist 
predictions, mean agreement was significantly below the midpoint of the 
scale.7 The same holds for the sandcastle scenario. Again people disagree with 
the assessment that what John said at the context of utterance was false 
(M=2.21, SD=1.99), and they also disagree with the claim that it stands in need 
of retraction (M=2.34, SD=1.92). Both means were significantly below the 
																																																								
6 https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=p37yp6 
7 Truth evaluation: t(36)=-5.29, p<001, CI [-2.43;-1.08]. Retraction: t(44)=-3.88, p<.001, CI [-1.87;-
.59]. 
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midpoint, signalling pronounced disagreement with the predictions of truth 
relativism.8  
 
Figure 1: Mean agreement with the statement that John’s taste claim was false 
at the context of utterance and that it must be retracted. Error bars denote 
standard error of the mean.  
 
Overall, the findings suggest that – consistent with contextualism - truth 
evaluation is sensitive to the context of utterance even if tastes have changed 
at the context of assessment. Given that John’s claims are not evaluated as 
false in retrospect, it comes as no surprise that people do not think they must 
be retracted.  
Does the relativist stand refuted? Not quite yet. Though the vignettes 
employed have been modelled closely on the relativist’s own examples, one 
might reasonably call into question the endurance of the pragmatic 
commitment to retract a taste claim true at context of utterance c1 yet false at 
context of assessment c2, if the contexts are separated by two decades.9 
																																																								
8 Truth evaluation: t(38)=-5.64, p<.001, CI [-2.44;-1.15]. Retraction t(43)=-5.74, p<.001, CI [-2.24; 
-1.08].  
9 Von Fintel and Gillies (2008: 84-86) discuss time lag with respect to epistemic modal claims, 
which are also deemed assessment-sensitive by relativists and for which a retraction 
requirement allegedly arises, too. Since knowledge accumulates over time, the larger the time 
span that separates context of utterance and context of assessment, the higher the chances 
that the original claim stands in need of retraction. However, Von Fintel and Gillies argue, ‘the 
facts go the other way, as ta [the time of assessment] gets much later than tc [the time of 
utterance], it becomes increasingly silly to go in for the sort of rejection that [relativism] 
predicts.’ (2008: 86). For instance, if Mary is to guess a randomly chosen card put into an 
envelope by John, and if the question is only resolved ten years later, it seems exceedingly odd 





















Perhaps the requirement to retract wears off over time. Furthermore, it might 
well be the case that such a requirement does not arise for claims made during 
childhood, as children are held much less responsible for their actions and 
utterances than adults. What it takes is thus an experiment with yet another 
vignette in which (i) the protagonist is not specified to be a child at the context 
of utterance and in which (ii) the context of utterance and the context of 
assessment are not separated by a long time span.  
 
3. Experiment 2: Time lag Concerns 
Experiment 3 addresses the potential concern regarding childhood assertions 
and time lag. Naturally, tastes do not change from one moment to the next, 
so while the time lag must be reduced considerably, excess should be avoided. 
In the new scenario (see below), it has been reduced from twenty years to a 
few weeks.  
 
3.1 Participants 
120 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete a 
paid Qualtrics online survey. After discarding non-native speakers, speed-
clickers (t<15 seconds) and participants failing an attention test 87 participants 
remained (38 female, age M=44 years, SD=14 years). 
 
3.2 Materials & Procedure 
The two versions (A v. B) of the target scenario read:  
 
SALMON 
It’s Ben’s birthday. To celebrate the occasion, Mary takes him out to her favourite 
restaurant. Ben loves salmon, and says to Mary: ‘Salmon is delicious.’ A few weeks 
later, Ben’s tastes regarding salmon have changed. Sally asks him whether he still likes 
salmon and Ben says he doesn’t anymore.       
 
[A] Mary says: ‘So what you said in the restaurant a few weeks ago was false.  
[B] Mary says: ‘So you are required to take back what you said about salmon a few 
weeks ago in the restaurant.’      
 
																																																								
claim. Note that this train of thought constitutes a counterargument to the very logic of 
relativism. By contrast, I am trying to explore how similar considerations could be used in favour 
of relativism, so as to give the position its best shot. More particularly the suggestion is that 
due to the time lag the anti-relativist evidence of experiment 1 and 2 must be disregarded.  
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Q.: To what extent do you agree or disagree with Mary’s claim? (1= completely 
disagree; 7= completely agree) 
 
As in the previous experiment, contextualists, according to whom what matters 
for truth evaluation is the context of utterance would predict mean agreement 
for both tasks to lie significantly below the midpoint of the scale, signifying 
disagreement with Mary’s claims. Truth relativists, by contrast, would predict 
agreement to lie significantly above the midpoint of the scale.  
 
3.3 Results  
The results for the Salmon scenario are basically the same as for the previous 
two scenarios – mean agreement with falsity and retraction does not differ 
significantly across the three vignettes (Figure 2).10 Again, people strongly 
disagreed with the claim that Ben’s original utterance was false (M=2.41, 
SD=1.69) or that it must be retracted (M=2.51, SD=1.94). Both means were 
significantly below the midpoint of the scale.11  
 
 
Figure 2: Mean agreement with the statement that Ben’s taste claim was false 
at the context of utterance and that it must be retracted. Error bars denote 
standard error of the mean.  
 
																																																								
10 A 3 (scenario: Fish sticks, Sandcastle, Salmon) x 2 (value: falsity, retraction) ANOVA reveals 
no significant effect for scenario (F(355)=.91, p=.405) or value (F(355)=1.22, p=.270). The 
interaction is also nonsignificant (F(355)=.62, p=.537).  























Experiment 2 addressed two potential sources of distortion of the first two 
experiments: (i) the fact that the protagonist in the first two vignettes was a 
child at the context of utterance, and (ii) the time lag of two decades between 
the context of utterance and assessment. As it turns out, the worry was 
unfounded: The results for the Salmon scenario are equivalent to those of the 
other two experiments in all respects (scenario did not have a significant effect, 
see FN 8). The contextualist predictions proved again correct with regards to 
both dependent variables, and the relativist predictions were shown as 
empirically mistaken. The truth of claims of personal taste are sensitive to the 
context of utterance only, and they are not subject to a rule of retraction.   
 
4. Experiment 3 – Benchmark Comparisons 
 
In the previous experiments, we used the absolute means as an indicator of 
agreement and disagreement (as is common practice, see e.g. the related 
work by Knobe & Yalcin, 2014). Although our results were decisive and robust 
across three scenarios, one could make a case that they are in parts driven by 
a certain degree of bewilderment as to the nature of the rather astonishing 
scenarios and tasks. We could, however, also collect data on more clear-cut 
cases – cases where the protagonist’s taste does not change – and use them 
as benchmarks for the target tasks tested so far.  
 
4.1 Benchmarks 
According to the relativist picture, a change in tastes gives rise to a change in 
truth-assessment, since taste claims are evaluated at the context of 
assessment. The results for the target scenario, in which John used to like fish 
sticks yet no longer does (call this condition ‘Yes/No’), should pattern with 
those from a scenario in which John didn’t like fish sticks as a child and still 
doesn’t (‘No/No’). In either case the claim ‘Fish sticks are tasty’, uttered 20 
years earlier, is false as assessed form the present context of assessment and 
thus requires retraction. The only difference is that in the relativist benchmark 
case it was, in fact, never true. Hence, relativists and contextualists alike would 
agree that the claim must be evaluated as having been false. What is more, in 
such a case it is prima facie not implausible to hold that the claim stands in 
need of retraction on grounds neutral with regards to the debate between 
contextualists and relativists.   
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According to contextualism, by contrast, the perspectival feature of 
taste claims is provided by the context of utterance.12  Hence, the truth-value 
of John’s claim must be evaluated relative to the context of utterance, and it 
rests constant over contexts of assessment. A theory-neutral benchmark case 
for the contextualist’s predictions is thus one in which John used to like fish 
sticks, and still does (‘Yes/Yes’): Both relativists and contextualists agree that 
in such a case John’s claim should not be assessed as false and that he is not 
required to retract it. Hence, with the two control cases in place we can also 
assess the relative fit of the target scenario results with the particular levels of 
mean agreement gathered in the benchmark experiments.  
In short, then, we will compare the results for the target scenarios not 
only to the midpoint of the scale, but also to benchmark scenarios that broadly 
mirror the rates of agreement predicted by relativists and contextualists. This 
procedure allows us to gain some insight as to whether the experiment design 
is successful on the basis of cases where contextualists and relativists agree.13  
 
4.2 Materials 
For each of the three vignettes, I devised two benchmark cases of the sort just 
described. For the Fish Sticks scenario, they read:  
 
 Fish Sticks (Yes/Yes) 
John is five years old and loves fish sticks. One day he says to his sister 
Sally: ‘Fish sticks are delicious.’  Twenty years later his taste regarding 
fish sticks has not changed. Sally asks him whether he still likes fish sticks 
and John says he still does. 
																																																								
12 We will concentrate on the assumptions and predictions of indexical contextualism. So we 
will set aside nonindexical contextualism, according to which the truth assessment of others’ 
claims pattern with relativist predictions and the truth assessment of one’s own previous claims 
with predictions of indexical contextualism. The results below put pressure on the sort of 
nonindexical contextualism proposed as a better alternative to indexicalism via faultless 
disagreement arguments, such as the one defended e.g. by Kölbel (2004, 2004, 2009). The only 
nonindexical contextualist position consistent with the data here proposed is a very moderate 
sort, which is truth-conditionally equivalent with indexicalism. For discussion cf. Stojanovic 
(2007); Recanati (2007) seems to defend a view along these lines.  
13 Note that the target results might differ significantly from both benchmarks. Given the fact 
that simple changes in framing can suffice to produce considerable differences in response to 
an otherwise identical scenario (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1981; Malenka et al., 1993), and that the 
differences in target and benchmark cases go beyond framing only, this is in fact quite likely. 
As always with empirical data, we should be careful in interpreting our findings and look to the 
effect sizes, not just to p-values, if necessary.  
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Fish Sticks (No/No)  
John is five years old and hates fish sticks. One day he says to his sister 
Sally: ‘Fish sticks are delicious.’ Twenty years later his taste regarding 
fish sticks has not changed. Sally asks him whether he still likes fish sticks 
and John says that he in fact never did and still doesn't. 
 
The questions were identical to the ones from Experiment 1. The benchmark 
vignettes for the Sandcastle and Salmon vignettes are stated in full in the 
Appendix. For each scenario, there were thus three variations. Each participant 
was randomly assigned to either the truth evaluation or retraction task of one 
of them.  
 
4.3 Participants 
A total of 386 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. After 
excluding inattentive participants, non-native English speakers and those 
responding in under 15 seconds, 297 participants (126 female) remained. 
 
4.4 Results  
For truth assessment, a 3 (case type: Yes/No v. Yes/Yes v. No/No) x 3 (scenario: 
Fish sticks v. Sandcastle v. Salmon) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
for case type, a nonsignificant effect for scenario and a nonsignificant 
interaction (see Figure 3).14 Given the absence of any effects for scenario, the 
means were averaged across scenarios. Consistent with the results from above, 
agreement for the target scenario (M=1.72, SD=1.08) was significantly below 
the midpoint.15 Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons also showed it to 
be considerably below the relativist benchmark case No/No (M=5.96, 
SD=1.83)16 – which itself was significantly above the midpoint.17 Importantly, 
however, there was no significant difference in truth assessment across the 
Yes/No case and the contextualist benchmark Yes/Yes (M=1.38, SD=1.23).18 
																																																								
14  Case type: F(2,132)=162.02, p<.001; scenario: F(2,132)=1.74, p=.180; interaction: 
F(4,132)=1.11, p=.353. 
15 t(38)=-13.26, p<.001 CI [-2.63;-1.93]. 
16 p<.001, Cohen’s d=3.03.  
17 t(49)=7.58, p<.001, CI [1.44;2.48] 
18 p=.911, Cohen’s d=.31 
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Figure 3: Mean agreement with falsity and retraction for the target scenario 
(Yes/No), the contextualist benchmark (Yes/Yes) and the relativist benchmark 
(No/No). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
For retraction, a 3 (case type: Yes/No v. Yes/Yes v. No/No) x 3 (scenario: Fish 
sticks v. Sandcastle v. Salmon) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
case type, a nonsignificant main effect for scenario and a nonsignificant 
interaction.20 Given the absence of any effects for scenario, the means were 
averaged across scenarios.  Consistent with our previous experiments, mean 
retraction for the target scenario (M=2.05, SD=1.60) was significantly below 
the midpoint.21 Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons also showed it to 
be considerably below the relativist benchmark case No/No (M=4.25, 
SD=1.97) 22   which – interestingly, did not differ significantly from the 
midpoint.23 Again, the means for the target scenario differed but little from the 
contextualist benchmark case Yes/Yes (M=1.30, SD=.78), just about making 
the significance threshold.24 
																																																								
19 t(51)=-16.80, p<.001, CI [-2.93;-2.30]. 
20 Case type: F(2,147)=57.51, p<.001; scenario: F(2,147)=1.06, p=.349; interaction: F(4,147)=.14, 
p=.966. 
21 t(43)=-7.99, p<.001, CI [-2.45;-1.46]. 
22 p<.001, Cohen’s d=2.04 
23 t(55)=.99, p=.329, CI [-.26;.76]. 
24  p=.043, Cohen’s d=.62; The contextualist benchmark – like the target scenario – was  























4.5 Discussion  
The benchmark scenarios suggest that our experimental design works well. In 
clear-cut cases where the protagonist’s claim was true at the context of 
utterance, and remains true at the context of assessment (Yes/Yes), 
disagreement with its assessment as false as well as required retraction are 
low. In the relativist benchmark case (No/No), by contrast, where the 
protagonist’s claim was false both at the context of utterance and the context 
of assessment, agreement with its assessment as false is very pronounced. 
Agreement with the view that it must be retracted is also quite high – or at 
least much higher than in the other two cases (more on this retraction result 
below). With the possible exception of the retraction in the No/No scenario, 
the results for the benchmark cases thus came out exactly as predicted by both 
contextualists and relativists.  
Replicating the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, the absolute results 
for truth assessment and retraction in the target case are again consistent with 
contextualism and inconsistent with truth relativism. Moreover, the 
comparative results replicate this pattern: Truth assessment in the target case 
(Yes/No) does not differ significantly from the results of the contextualist 
benchmark case (Yes/Yes). They do, however, differ significantly from the 
results of the relativist benchmark (No/No). For retraction, the target results 
also differ significantly from the relativist benchmark. In fact, they also just 
about make the threshold for significance in the contrast with the contextualist 
benchmark. However, whereas the latter difference must certainly be 
acknowledged (Cohen’s d=.62), the effect size of the difference is quite small 
vis-à-vis the contrast with the relativist benchmark (Cohen’s d=2.04), and this 
is what matters here (see FN 13).  
One interesting feature of the results bears mentioning: Even for taste 
claims which are and have been blatantly false (the No/No cases), and which 
are clearly assessed as such, there is no decisive support for a retraction 
requirement. This is illustrated by Figure 4, where the No/No cases for all three 
scenarios are plotted in a single graph:  
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Figure 4: Mean agreement with the statement that the target claim was false/stands in need 
of retraction for the No/No conditions of the Fish Sticks, Sandcastle and Salmon scenarios. 
Error bars designate standard error of the mean.   
Participants tend to neither agree nor disagree with the statement that the 
false taste claim must be retracted. This suggests that assertion simply is not 
governed by a constitutive norm of this sort, even in cases most favourable to 
its potential application. Beyond the empirical refutation of retraction 
predictions in the cases in which the relativist takes such a norm to also apply, 
doubts thus accrue whether any theory would be justified to invoke a retraction 
norm as an empirically confirmed phenomenon. Assertion is not subject to a 
retraction norm and the extensive pragmatic machinery the relativist builds 
atop the norm is devoid of any empirical foundation.25   
																																																								
25 One reviewer made the following interesting point: In the No/No vignettes of Fish sticks and 
Salmon, the agent is specified not to like a certain food at time t1 and still doesn’t at t2, yet at 
t1 says it is delicious. The low retraction rates, the reviewer suggests could be due to the fact 
that participants assume that, at t2, the agent does not like the particular food, yet says it is 
delicious.  I agree that in certain domains, such as aesthetics, what one likes and what one 
deems beautiful can come apart if one advocates an objectivist conception of value. In the 
debate at hand, however, one is hard-pressed to find a defender of objective values concerning 
what is fun or tasty. This is why the claim “The salad is delicious but I don’t like it” sounds 
infelicitous.  
Naturally, it is possible to construct a clever case in which claims of this sort do not 
sound quite so bad. I doubt, however, that participants – in the clear and simple cases at hand 
– seriously entertain the thought that the agent dislikes the food yet deems it delicious and 
that this explains low retraction rates even in No/No cases. In the Sandcastle vignette, the 
No/No scenario specifies that, at t1 the agent doesn’t like building sandcastles yet says it is fun, 
and at t2 says it is not fun, yet the retraction ratings are nearly identical to the ones of Fish sticks 
and Salmon. Furthermore, in experiments regarding epistemic modals [author a], I also found 























The results are decisive and robust: In three experiments modelled on a 
scenario truth relativists present as ‘data’ in favour of their semantics, empirical 
data proper suggests otherwise. The predictions of MacFarlane-style relativism 
regarding truth-assessment and retraction stand refuted both in terms of 
absolute results, as well as vis-à-vis the relativist benchmark levels. The 
predictions of speaker-centred indexical contextualism, on the other hand, are 
confirmed in both respects.26 What is more, it is doubtful whether assertions 
are ever subject to a constitutive norm of assertion. Even when the contentious 
claim was false with respect to the context of utterance, ordinary language 
speakers see no evident need for the speaker to retract their assertion.27  
 
Relativism with regards to truth in English, we said, is an empirical position. 
The least demanding version of this view is easy to verify: All it takes is a 
demonstration that the extension of a single English expression is in fact used 
in assessment-dependent ways. Said version of the view is hard to falsify: 
According to relativists, there are many such expressions – predicates of 
personal taste, aesthetic predicates, moral expressions, epistemic modals, as 
well as the verb ‘to know’ and cognates, to name but a few. Given that the 
relativist predictions regarding truth-assessment have been empirically called 
into question for epistemic modals (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo, 2015, author 
a), and given that they turned out inadequate with respect to predicates of 
personal taste, too, one might see the burden of proof shift back to the 
relativist. In this regard, it is important to mention the excellent work of Beddor 
& Egan (2018), who present data on epistemic modals consistent with a 
“flexible” form of relativism, i.e. a form of truth relativism, where the relevant 
context of assessment is constrained by the Question under Discussion (see 
																																																								
context of utterance. Taken together, the evidence points towards the conclusion that there 
simply are no norms of retraction of the sort envisioned by MacFarlane.  
26 The results for the particular cases tested are not inconsistent with indexicalist approaches 
according to which the type of value of the tacit taste argument is somewhat flexible and allows, 
in certain contexts, for exocentric, generic or group readings. The particular cases at hand just 
favour an autocentric (or speaker-dependent) reading which, though not necessary in general, 
is quite likely the default.   
27 The data for epistemic modals presented by (author a) suggests the same. Knobe & Yalcin’s 
(2014) data on modals might suggest otherwise. This is likely due to the framing of their 
retraction question, which diverges strongly from the diction employed in MacFarlane’s 
retraction rule.  
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e.g. Roberts, 1996/2002, 2015). As I discuss elsewhere (author, b), this picture 
does not neatly carry over to predicates of personal taste, and the flexibility 
invoked to save relativism might easily collapse into an anything-goes picture. 
That said, with the many sophisticated theoretical materials at our disposal, 
the debate should – as demonstrated by Knobe & Yalcin, Khoo, as well as 
Beddor & Egan – be taken to the next, that is, the empirical, level. 
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